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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 
78A-3-102(3)(c), and pursuant to its Order granting Appellant's Petition for Leave to File 
Interlocutory Appeal and pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(URAP). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the Third-Party Complaint against Utah Down's Syndrome 
Foundation, Inc. ("UDSF") properly joined to the disciplinary action initiated by Utah 
State Bar (which is not a party to this appeal)? 
PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue was expressly preserved 
in the ruling of the trial court which stated that this issue was a subject of its ruling. (R. 
311) Both parties raise this issue in their respective briefs. The Standard of Review is 
whether the trial court properly permitted joinder. Interpretation of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure ("URCP") is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Goldberg 
v. Jay Timmons & Assoc, 896 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Utah Ct App.1995) 
2. Must the Third-Party Complaint filed by Respondent, Third-Party Plaintiff 
and Appellee Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. ("Mr. Gilbert") be dismissed under the doctrines of 
either collateral estoppel or res judicata? 
PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: These issues were expressly 
preserved by the court below which stated these as issues decided in its ruling that is the 
subject of this appeal. (R. 311) The questions are reviewed for correctness. Miller v. 
USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663 (Utah 2002) 
1 
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3. Was the UDSF Motion to Dismiss properly treated as a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied? 
PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: This question was expressly raised 
by the trial court as a subject of its ruling. Thus the question is preserved for correctness. 
Norman v. Arnold 57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002) (R. 311) The Standard of Review also 
arises from URCP Rule 56(c) which requires that". . . the pleadings, . . . and admissions 
on file together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and [that UDSF is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. APPELLANT'S DEFICIENT STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Brief of Appellant UDSF, at pages 2-7, contains a lengthy "Statement of 
Facts" drawn from the self-serving Affidavit of Suzanne Smith1 filed in support of 
UDSF's Motion to Dismiss in the trial court. (R. 82-87) 
Clearly, UDSF failed to meet its duty to properly marshal the facts under URAP 
Rule 24(a)(9). The process of marshaling the evidence is fundamentally different from 
that of presenting evidence at trial. The challenging party must temporarily remove its 
own prejudices and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to the party's 
own case. Child v. Child, 194 P.3d 205 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
1
 Even if the facts set forth in the Affidavit of Suzanne Smith, the former president of 
UDSF, were relevant, the affidavit is inadmissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 602 
because of her failure to state that she has "personal knowledge", and Rule 56(c) that she 
is "competent to testify to the truth of those facts." 
2 
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Not only are UDSF's facts improperly marshaled, but most of the facts set forth in 
the proffered Affidavit of Suzanne Smith comprise evidence that might be offered at trial 
but are not relevant to the two narrow procedural issues presented by UDSF's 
Interlocutory Appeal now before this Court. 
UDSF wholly failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court findings. 
Harris v. IES Assocs. 69 P.3d 297 (Utah 2003) UDSF completely ignored and failed to 
marshal the facts set forth in the Affidavit of Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. (R. 189-194) 
The following are facts set forth in Mr. Gilbert's Affidavit that were omitted from 
the facts that UDSF should have included in Appellant's Brief in compliance with the 
marshaling rule: 
1. Mr. Gilbert is a member in good standing of Utah State Bar. (R. 192) 
2. Mr. Gilbert served as legal counsel to UP TOWN DOWNS ("UTD") and 
UP WITH DOWNS ("UWD") in 2006, 2007, and 2008. (R. 193) 
3. Mr. Gilbert was familiar with the operations of UTD and UWD in 2006, 
2007 and 2008. (R. 193) 
4. UDT and UWD operated autonomously from UDSF. (R. 193) 
5. UTD and UWD each elected their own officers and directors. (R. 193) 
6. UTD and UWD each maintained their own checking accounts. (R. 193) 
7. UTD and UWD each entered their own contracts and retained their own 
professional advisors. (R. 193) 
8. UTD and UWD each paid their own liabilities. (R. 193) 
3 
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I 
9. Officers and Directors of UDSF did not control or operate either UTD or 
UWD.(R. 193) * 
10. UDSF officers were not authorized to sign checks on either the UTD or the 
UWD bank accounts. (R. 193)
 i 
11. In 2007, UDSF filed an action in the Third District against Utah Down 
Syndrome Association and seven individuals: Eric Holman, Cathy Collard, Pam 
i 
Holman, Jill Austin, Lisa Kingsbury, Kara Oiander, and Melanie Taylor entitled Utah 
Down's Syndrome Foundation, Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Association, Civil No. 
070902087, Appellate No. 20110205 (the "UDSF Action")2. (R. 192) i 
12. Judge Paul G. Maughan ordered, by default, injunctive relief against those 
seven named individuals on May 3, 2007, in the UDSF Action, but not against UTD, 
UWD or Mr. Gilbert (the "May 3 Order"). (R. 73-76) See Addendum No. 1 attached 
hereto. 
13. UTD paid legal fees of $15,000 to Mr. Gilbert in 2007. The checks were { 
signed by Wendy Hooton and Sandra Perkes, who were not subject to the May 3 Order. 
(R. 191) See Addendum No. 1 attached hereto. 
14. UWD paid $9,000 to Mr. Gilbert. That check was signed by Cherish 
Clements, who was not subject to the May 3 Order. (R. 191) See Addendum No. 1 
attached hereto. 
2
 The UDSF Action is also on appeal to be heard in this court at the same time this court 
hears the appeal in the Instant Action. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15. UWD paid a further $6,000 to Mr. Gilbert. That check was signed by Eric 
Holman. Though Mr. Holman had been initially enjoined, he had subsequently been re-
elected and authorized by UWD to issue the check. (R. 199-201) 
16. Mr. Gilbert subsequently filed a Complaint in Intervention in the UDSF 
Action on behalf of UTD and UWD. (R. 190) 
17. Mr. Gilbert was not a named as a defendant in the UDSF Action. He was 
never served with a Summons and Complaint to make him a party in the UDSF Action 
under URCP Rule 4. Nonetheless, Judge Robert Faust, to whom the UDSF Action had 
been reassigned, issued an ORDER AND JUDGMENT (DONALD GILBERT) ordering 
Mr. Gilbert to pay $30,000 plus attorney's fees and costs to UDSF. (R. 61-64) See 
Addendum No. 2 attached hereto. 
In addition to the facts set forth in Mr. Gilbert's affidavit, there are in the record 
supporting affidavits of Cherish Clements, Wendy Hooton, Lisa Kingsbury, Kathy 
Yerkes and Leigh Ann Schoenfield (R. 162-187), which were also presented to the Court 
in opposition to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. None of the facts in those affidavits 
were marshaled in Appellant's Statement of Facts. 
This court may properly decline to reach the merits of the UDSF Appeal because 
UDSF failed to fulfill its duty to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
decision. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Control Inc., 222 P.3d 1164 (Utah 2009). 
B. APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts properly marshaled to support the ruling of the trial court are as follows: 
5 
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1. Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. is a member in good standing of Utah State Bar. (R. 
194) 
2. Pursuant to the claims of UDSF, Utah State Bar alleged that $30,000 in 
legal fees paid by UTD and UWD to their legal counsel, Mr. Gilbert, was misuse of funds 
which actually belonged to UDSF. (R. 1-12) 
3. In the UDSF Action, the seven named individual defendants: Eric 
Holman, Cathy Collard, Pam Holman, Jill Austin, Lisa Kingsbury, Kara Olander, and 
Melanie Taylor, were the subject to the May 3 Order issued by Judge Paul G. Maughan. 
(R. 73-76) See Addendum No. 1 attached hereto. The May 3 Order was entered by 
default against only the named defendants, and not against UTD, UWD or Mr. Gilbert, 
who were not parties to the UDSF Action. (R. 73-76) The defendants in the UDSF 
Action were represented by Graham H. Norris, Jr., not Mr. Gilbert. (R. 192) 
4. Subsequently, on October 17, 2007, Judge Maughan made a ruling 
permitting Mr. Gilbert to represent UTD and UWD as interveners in the UDSF Action, 
attempting, inter alia, to set aside the earlier default May 3 Order. (R. 194-196) Judge 
Faust acknowledged on the record that Mr. Gilbert was entitled to be paid for legal 
services, but ruled that the funds used by UTD and UWD to pay Mr. Gilbert should not 
have been used for that purpose.3 
Neither UTD nor UWD were parties to the UDSF action. They were not subject to the 
default May 3 Order issued by Judge Maughan, nor were Wendy Hooton and Sandra 
Perkes, who issued UTD checks or Cherish Clements, who issued a UWD check, to pay 
legal fees to Mr. Gilbert. One check was issued by Eric Holman. Though he was subject 
to the May 3 Order, he had subsequently been re-elected by UWD and authorized to issue 
a check to Mr. Gilbert. (R. 199-201) 
6 
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5. Judiic kiusl uhk/tal (llul Ihi1 parlies kToii1 IIIIII in llic I II >SI .V'lion \NIIO 
were subject to the May 3 Order, were to "return" to UDSF the sum of the legal fees that 
had been paid to Mr. Gilbert. Then, on December 21, 2007, UDSF brought a separate 
i i iotioi i for Disgorgemei it of Pi it ids tc coi i ipel I\ li Gilbei It to disgorge the legal fees he 
had been paid by UTD and U WD. (R. 142-143) 
6. Though Mr. Gilbert was not a party to the I JDSF Action, and had never 
beei i ser ved witl i a Si n r n noi is ai id Coi i lplaint (R 190). Ii idge K- . - Faust enh cu * 
money Judgment in favor oi UDSF and against Mr. Gilbert on ; , ^ "*< H) 189-
192) See Addendum No. 2 attached hereto. Thereafter, Mr. Gilben was in such a suik of 
shock, M \c uffered a nenrt attack ,.\u\ a nervous breakdown. m • v* b1" 
7 . • ' :• - . . - • ; . * - . , -
190), UDSF petitioned Utah State Bar to take disciplinary action against Mr. Gilbert. 
I Jl:<-! state i iai ihen commenced this action against Mr. Gilbert in the Fourth District 
( ' I I ill! n i l M ; i \ I ( ' 1 1 1 0 (ill I" IM N n i l l l ( l " l ( l ! ( v | l i Uub,\V I ' l l 1 *! I ) Mii 'W i f f p i V ^ n l i M L ' ( H i t 
"Instant Action"). (R. 142) 
The relevant procedural facts are as follows: 
1. Oi 11 i la,)/ 13. 2010,1 Ftal i State Bar coi nmei iced its disciplinary action 
against Mr. Gilbert based on the complaint of UDSF that he was improperly paid cei tain 
legal fees by UTD and UWD, which were merely fictitious business names of I JDSF. (R. 
1 12) 
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2. On June 23, 2010 Mr. Gilbert filed in the Instant Action a Third-Party 
Complaint against UDSF (R. 30-45) seeking Declaratory Relief that UTD and UWD 
were not merely fictitious names of UDSF, but "had the right to pay their liabilities for 
legal services rendered from their own bank accounts." (R. 42) Alternately, in the event 
that UTD and UWD were found to be merely fictitious names of UDSF, then the assets 
and liabilities (including the obligation to compensate Mr. Gilbert for legal service 
rendered) also belonged to UDSF. (R. 41) 
3. On July 9, 2010 UDSF served an Answer to the Third-Party Complaint (R. 
49-53) and on July 19, 2010, UDSF served an Amended Answer to the Third-Party 
Complaint. (R. 54-58) 
4. Thereafter, on August 9, 2010, UDSF served its Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)4 or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the 
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 59-97) 
5. On August 25, 2010 Mr. Gilbert filed and served his opposition to the 
UDSF Motion to Dismiss, which included as Schedule 1, a list of disputes regarding facts 
stated by UDSF, and specific grounds for those disputes. (R. 117-137) 
6. On September 7, 2010 following oral argument before Judge Fred D. 
Howard, the UDSF Motion to Dismiss was submitted for decision. On November 7, 
4
 Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a motion making of defenses thereunder "shall be made 
before pleading". Consequently, the motion to dismiss was untimely and was properly 
denied. 
8 
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?l l I  ( u i h i c I In \ .ml H I H I I ii i! IIM t k v i .IUM nl tin 1 n m l l i I >i I n n I o u i l Acm i n r I "1 >SI s 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 306-372). See Addendum No. 3 attached hereto. 
7. I Jpoi i tl le !v lotioi i of I It< il; i State: Bai , the Ii istai it Vcti :)! i vv as stayed to a > vait 
resolution of a related matter pending in the UDSF Action5 . (R. 313-314) See the Order. 
(R 3 7 3 - 3 7 7 ) • • . • . 
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T S 
I 
The UDSF Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) was untimely and improper. It 
was brought after UDSF had answered the Third- i <>mplaint i>» .. 11 \ w 2010 and 
ftitlliiei" i i i in i iu l r , ! ml , A I ISVW/I oi l • " - Hi h mi 
must be filed before any pleading is filed. 
II 
I'D SI ;" i i io\ ing papers w ere ii ir 1:1 lei fatally de ficiei it as they failed tc meet the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) that the motion to dismiss must admit the facts alleged in the 
Third-Party Complaint. Appellant failed to properly marshal the facts. 
: . , . . II II I . - : 
The facts alleged in the Third-Party Complaint are sufficient to -u\\c ,M 
of Action for Declaratory Relief and a Second Cause of Action for a money Judgment. 
5
 Then pending in the UDSF Action was a Motion to Vacate, Expunge or Set Aside the 
Order and Judgment against Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. That motion was denied. The ruling 
on that Motion is the subject of an appeal now pending before this Coiirt and to be heard 
and determined contemporaneously with this appeal. 
9 
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I 
Mr. Gilbert sought only a declaration as to whether UTD and UWD are merely fictitious 
businesses of UDSF as claimed by UDSF and as alleged by Utah State Bar. The second 
cause of action sought to recover fees due from UDSF if UTD and UWD were found to 
be merely fictitious business names of UDSF. * 
IV 
The Third-Party Complaint was properly raised in the action of Utah State Bar 
4 
seeking to discipline Mr. Gilbert. URCP Rule 14 and Rule 20(a). Even if there were a 
misjoinder, that would not give rise to a dismissal, but instead to a severance of the 
Third-Party Complaint. URCP Rule 20(b) < 
V 
Justice and Judicial Efficiency as well as common sense are all served by trying 
( 
the complaint of Utah State Bar and the Third-Party Complaint of Mr. Gilbert in the same 
action. URCP Rule 20(a) authorizes permissive joinder in such situations. 
VI 
The UDSF Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment was not properly supported 
by admissible evidence. Evidentiary objections to the Affidavit of Suzanne Smith were
 ( 
properly raised below. (R. 112-133) The UDSF Motion for Summary Judgment failed to 
show, as URCP Rule 56(c) requires, "that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact." The affidavit of Mr. Gilbert (R. 117-137), as specifically discussed hereinabove, 
raised factual issues that were not and cannot be resolved in a Summary Judgment 
Motion. 
10 
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The Rules of Res Judicata aiid Collateral Estoppel have no application to the 
Instant Action, I he I JDSI ; Action did i lot involve the same parties or the same issues as 
leading to a final Judgment. None of those requirements were shown to have been met 
by the UDSF moving papers. 
ARGUMENT 
i 
THE UDSF MOTION TO DISMISS 
WAS AND IS UNTIMELY AND IMPROPER 
I JDSI' M -nn l il . \ I I M U T I W I I I < l l l i ini Pail) I <HII|II,HMI on luh «>.2<l|n \\< 4'* "i i i 
and soon thereafter on Jul) 19, 2010, served its Amended Answer to the i hud Karh 
Complaint. (R 54-58) Both of these pleadings were served before August 9, 2010, when 
Hi >SI'" served Us MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO URCP RULE 12(b)(6), OR 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOl iuM r u k Su M M A R Y JuuuMl: , \ I low n I IM T" 
Rule 12(b) requires that "A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 
pleading il a fin tiicr pleading is permitted", (emphasis added) Consequently, the motion 
of UDSF to dismiss was imlinu:h III \ tolatal (lit- lojuiicmrnls ol I l|<( T Rule I 'ihi II 
must be denied on that ground. 
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II 
THE UDSF MOTION TO DISMISS IS FATALLY DEFICIENT 
FOR FAILING TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE FACTS 
The UDSF motion papers failed to meet the requirements of URCP Rule 12(b) and 
Rule 56, under which a motion to dismiss must admit the facts alleged in the complaint 
and challenge only the right to relief based on those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991), Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 
(Utah 1995) 
In ruling on a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and indulge all reasonable 
inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 828 P. 2d 1055 (Utah 
1991), Russell v. Standard Corp, supra. 
For the reasons cited above, Appellant's Statement of Facts attached to the moving 
papers of UDSF is irrelevant and not subject to consideration by this court or the court 
below with respect to the UDSF Motion to Dismiss as Appellant has failed to properly 
marshal the facts. The Affidavit of Suzanne Smith, which purportedly supports the 
motion, fails to meet the necessary standards for admission into evidence. See URCP 
Rule 56(c). As shown hereinabove, specific Objections were properly presented to the 
Court below by Mr. Gilbert. (R. 120-127) 
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Ill 
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN MR. GILBERT'S THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT ARE SUFFICIENT TO STATE CAUSES OF 
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND FOR A MONEY JUDGMENT 
r
* •
 s
 . .: w !•; Mi . ; equest 
for Declaratory Relief as to whether UTD and U WD were merely fictitious business 
names ("DBAs") of UDSF as alleged in Utah State Bar's Complaint. Utah Code 78B-6-
401 grai its to eacl i District Coi it it ," :" t l le power to issue declaratory judgment 
determining rights, status, and other relatioi 1^ ^ ! , / , 
"Declaratory Judgment", and Shipman v. Evans, 100P.3d 1151 (Utah 2004). ( Fhere 
must be a genuine issue of dispute between two parties to receive a declaratory 
judgn lei it ) 
The second cause of action is also a straight forward pleading seeking 
compensation for professional services rendered if the court should decide that UTD and 
I ) W D w ere ai id ai < : • i i lei ely DB A s of I fDSF 
"The doctrine of apparent authority has its roots in equitable esloppt/I. j . i i , v. 
West Valley City, 840 P.2d l 1 - H 8 (Utah 1992) (Howe, Assoc. C. J. dissenting), "...it 
is fc i it ided oi I tl ie idea tl lat m ic i e < >i le of two persons suffer from the wrong of a third the 
loss should fall on the one whose conduct created the ciirumsliuuvs w Im I) ni.nl.' Ili< " 
possible." 
As tools i . Ljuiiv. iestitution and unjust enrichment are claims and remedies 
employed only when ? M r \ |
 Ai, ^ llD, ci s Owners Assoc, v. 
CCI Mech. Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1996). See also Emergens IMiysicians 
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Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 167 P.3d 1080 (Utah 2007). (Quantum Meruit is an 
equitable tool that allows a plaintiff to receive restitution for the reasonable value of 
services provided to the defendant.) 
IV 
MR. GILBERT'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT WAS 
PROPERLY RAISED IN UTAH STATE BAR'S DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
Though not characterized as a URCP Rule 14 Motion, the thrust of the UDSF 
motion appears to be that Mr. Gilbert's Third-Party Complaint was not properly joined 
with the Disciplinary Action initiated by Utah State Bar. 
Mr. Gilbert's claim for Declaratory Relief under Count One and Judgment against 
UDSF for fees earned under Count Two may properly be joined with the State Bar's 
Disciplinary action. The allegations of Mr. Gilbert in his Third-Party Complaint, even if 
it were severed or separated under URCP Rule 21, would not give rise to dismissal as 
sought by the UDSF motion, because "Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal 
of an action.", but only for an order that the Third-Party Complaint "may be severed and 
proceeded with separately". 
Though UDSF asserts a misjoinder under URCP Rule 14 because there is no 
"monetary" claim made by Utah State Bar against Mr. Gilbert (R. 91), such an argument 
reads into URCP Rule 14 language that simply is not there. URCP Rule 14 contains no 
provision that the claim made in the underlying complaint must be a "monetary" claim as 
UDSF claims. URCP Rule 14(a) actually provides as follows: 
"(a) When the defendant may bring in a Third Party. Any time 
after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, 
14 
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11lay cause a Summons and Complaint to be served upon a person not a 
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the 
plaintiff's claims against 1lit11,,"'"" 
Since the I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal Rules of 
Civil I :>:n >cedi 11 i : , Mam Sired \. Fast Heat Inc., 9*) iJI U\ Sill illhih /"OiMi Jiuk-r l lmun l 
properly interpreted URCP Rule 14 by reference to the nearly identical language in Rule 
14 of the Federal R ules of Civil Procedure and the accompanying notes which cite 
Moore's Federal Practice-Civil statii lg tl lat: 
ilk uuiurt ol'lhe relief sought by plaintiff in the t mdei \y ii lg actioi i n lay 
i M t )b defendant of its ability to implead. 
• • • 
"Although one can argue that the plaintiff s judgment does not 'cost5 the 
defendant anything that can be passed onto the third-party defendant, 
the courts have properly allowed impleadei 
"Courts quite properly, then, conclude that the interpleader rule is to be 
construed liberally to achieve its goal of efficient and consistent 
resolution of multiparty dispiites." 
3 Moore's Federal Practice-Civil §14.04[2 | (20 KM Sa •ilsuJiulp l i m p i d -, Kuliny set 
forth in Addendum No, 3 
I Hah State liar's complaint alleges that Mr Gilbert improperly received payment 
for legal services rendered to UTD ai u I I I WD .il a hiiic \\hvn vrum i I I «1 i \ uiujlh , hut 
neither UTD nor UWD) were enjoined from making any such payments. Mr. Gilbert was 
never enjoined from receiving such payments. (R. 73-76) See Addendum No 1.1 Jtal t 
State Bar's dis* ipliiiiir< rwinplriinl lln/n alleges Ih.tl Mi »> iilln;ii improperly retained tl le 
fees paid to him. 
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Obviously, Utah State Bar's claim rests upon the allegation that Mr. Gilbert had 
no right to receive or retain the fees paid to him by UTD and UWD. Thus, Utah State 
Bar's claim arises from a monetary claim about which UDSF complained to Utah State 
Bar which, in turn, brought the Instant Action, because Mr. Gilbert did not disgorge to 
UDSF the fees that were properly earned for legal services rendered to UTD and UWD. 
The record shows that the checks written to Mr. Gilbert were issued, in each case 
but one, by individuals who were never subject to the May 3 Order or any injunction. The 
one check signer who had been subject to the Order, Eric Holman, had been subsequently 
re-elected by UWD and authorized by UWD to issue one check to Mr. Gilbert. There 
was no violation of the May 3 Order. (R. 73-76 and 190-191) See also Addendum No. 1 
attached hereto. 
Was Mr. Gilbert entitled to retain the fees paid to him for legal services? Even 
Judge Faust acknowledged in open court on March 10, 2008 that Mr. Gilbert was entitled 
to be paid for legal services rendered. (R. 190) Utah State Bar alleged that Mr. Gilbert 
was not entitled to be paid by UTD and UWD, and that is the essential claim upon which 
Utah State Bar's disciplinary complaint is based. If the chapters were merely DBAs of 
UDSF as Utah State Bar alleges, it certainly must follow that UDSF was the entity 
obligated to pay the fees due and payable to Mr. Gilbert for legal services properly 
rendered to UDSF's own fictitious business name chapters UTD and UWD. 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\ ' 
JUSTICE, JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND COMMON SENSE 
ARE ALL SERVED BY TRYING UTAH STATE BAR'S COMPLAINT 
AND MR. GILBERT'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT IN A SINGLE TRIAL 
l;veii il il nun first iipprui nppropi Kile In se\ IT ni M.-|KIJati, Mi h i l bu l . Ihihl 
Party Complaint from the underlying Utah State Bar6 complaint under URCP Rules 14, 
20(b) or 21 , there would then be rw.. ^M imilar ^ . M «> h : tried separately on similar 
issi les ai id w itl 1 essei iti;:: * :'»•• •*• s ^ s s e ^ in K.-. ^ \. tion and in the Instant 
Action. Aside from the risk oi inconsistent judgn ;\u m 
is considerable loss of judicial time and resources that would arise from trying these cases 
sepai ately, as essei itially all the same witnesses and issues will be necessary in both trials. 
URCP Rule 20 governing i •- •ss i \e Jmudu peimiils 111« inimlei »f Mi ' iillvrt's 1 IIIIIIJ 
Party Complaint to the Disciplinary Action brought by Utah State Bar. 
Ul<( T Rule 19(a), entitled "Joinder of Persons needed for just adjudication", 
pi '() « ' ides ii i rele^ ' ai it pai t as follows: " 4 person who is si tbject to service of process . . . 
shall be joined as a party in the action ij('I) in his absence complete relief cannot fa 
accorded among those already parties, 
As Pi < )ft :ssi >i 1 1 ii )IIIJ is< )bser\ es ii I I: lis treatise UTAH CIVIL PRACTICE (2010 
edition) at §3.02: 
"In most instances, economy for both the court and the parties is 
an adequate incentive to exercise the most extensive joinder of claims 
and remedies that is permitted under the rules." 
6
 It is important to note that Utah State Bar did not move to sever the Third-Party 
Complaint and is not a party to this appeal. 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial courts can little afford to expend scarce resources in separately trying two 
such overlapping and similar cases raising essentially the same issues of fact and law in 
each case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the joinder. 
VI 
THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
URCP Rule 56 governs Motions for Summary Judgment. It requires that 
supporting affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." URCP Rule 56 (e) 
The supporting Affidavit of Suzanne Smith does not meet the evidentiary 
standard required by URCP Rule 56. Ms. Smith did not swear that she has personal 
knowledge of the facts or that she would be competent to testify as to the facts in her 
affidavit. (R. 82-87) Furthermore, nearly all of the factual allegations in the Affidavit of 
Suzanne Smith fail to meet the requirements for admission into evidence. (R .120-127) 
See the objections made by Mr. Gilbert to the Affidavit of Suzanne Smith. (R. 106-116) 
A Motion for Summary Judgment must show "that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
URCP Rule 56(c) Quite to the contrary, in the Instant Action, the Affidavit of Mr. 
Gilbert, filed and served in opposition to the UDSF Motion for Summary Judgment, 
raises a number of questions of fact to be determined at trial as specifically discussed 
hereinabove. (R. 117-137) 
18 
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Where an affidavit shows on its face that there is a material issue of fact, summary 
judgment may not be entered, even if responsive affidavits are not filed. Frisbee v. K&K 
Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984) 
Despite the fact that the three year old Affidavit of Suzanne Smith, upon which the 
moving party UDSF relied, is objectionable and inadmissible, in an abundance of caution 
and in order to satisfy the requirements of URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Mr. Gilbert attached to 
his opposing papers a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that he 
controverted. (R. 106-115) 
VII 
THE RULES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
AND RES JUDICATA HAVE NO APPLICATION HERE 
Under URCP Rule 8(c), the Defense of Res Judicata must be raised in the Answer. 
Though UDSF purports to have raised Res Judicata as its SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE, it has not been alleged with the particularity required of such an Affirmative 
Defense. See Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Commissioner, 122 P.3d 700 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2005) and Midwest Realty v. City of West Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1975). 
See also Thomas, Utah Civil Practice (2010) § 8.02(3Xb)(n). 
Had UDSF pleaded those Affirmative Defenses with particularity, as required, it 
would have become clear that the UDSF Action (with seven named individual 
defendants) involved different parties than in the Instant Action, which does not name 
any of the same defendants. Even if the Affirmative Defenses had been properly pleaded, 
it has not been and could not be proven at this point in the proceedings by a 
19 
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I 
preponderance of evidence as required. Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 
1975) * 
Finally, as Judge Howard properly ruled, the impleader is not barred by the 
doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel for sound legal reasons. For a claim to be < 
precluded under the doctrine of res judicata, the following elements must be shown: 
"First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in ( 
the first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits." 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000) (quoting Masden ' 
v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)) 
For an issue to be precluded according to the principles of collateral estoppel the 
following elements must be shown: 
"First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in 
the case at hand. Second, the issue must have been decided in a final 
judgment on the merits in the previous action. Third, the issue must have 
been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth, 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action 
must have been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action." 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000) (quoting 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 1996)) 
See also Judge Howard's Ruling set forth in Addendum No. 3. 
The May 3 Order entered in the UDSF Action was a default order which was 
neither decided on the merits nor fully and fairly litigated. (R. 73-76) UDSF made no 
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showing that the record satisfies the necessary elements of either res judicata or collateral 
estoppel. Neither has application here. 
CONCLUSION 
The UDSF Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and 
the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment are both without basis and were properly 
denied by the Fourth District Court in the ruling by Judge Fred D. Howard dated 
November 17, 2010. See Addendum No. 3 attached hereto. The Ruling below should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this J^fcay of July. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Lynn O. Poulson 
Johnson, Poulson & Coons, 
a Professional Corporation 
and 
E. Barney Gesas 
^Of Counsel 
/ Andersen &H^rrenbbrg 
By Lynn O. Poulson, Counsel for 
ResponVlent/Third-Party Plaintiff and 
Appellee Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum No. 1. May 3, 2007 Order issued by Judge Paul G. Maughan in Utah Down's 
Syndrome Foundation, Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Association et. al. (the "May 3 
Order"). (R. 73-76) 
Addendum No. 2. June 18, 2008 Order and Judgment (Donald D. Gilbert) entered by 
Judge Robert Faust in Utah Down's Syndrome Foundation, Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome 
Association et. al. (the "Judgment"). (R. 61-64) 
Addendum No. 3. November 7, 2010 RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT issued by Judge Fred D. Howard in the matter of Donald P. 
Gilbert, Jr. Respondent and Third-Party Plaintiff v. Utah Down's Syndrome Foundation, 
Inc. (the "Ruling") (R. 306-312) 
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I certify that two true and correct copies of the Brief of the Appellee were mailed 
July rj, 2011 to the following via first-class mail, postage pre-paid: 
Russell A. Cline 
Crippen & Cline, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Diane Akiyama, Esq. 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East, Suite 205 
Salt U 
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Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Crippen&OineL.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 539-1900 
Telefax (801) 322-1054 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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vs. 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME 
ASSOCIATION, ERIC HOLMAN, 
CATHY COIXARD, PAM HOLMAN, 
JILL AUSTIN, LIS A KINGSBURY, 
KARA OLANDER, and 
MELLANIE TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
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in UDSF. 
^Areherebyrestrained fiom acting under the 
Downs or Up With Downs) in any respect; • 
(h) Are hereby restrained fiom 
American First Credit Union 
name of UDSF (or its dba Uptown 
accessing Zions Bank account # 326000617 and 
account#746007297930oranyUDSF&nds. 
_ . ^ ^ ^ S P 8 membership records or other fonns, 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l o n g r n g t o U D S F m a i i y r e s p e c t 
. ^ ^ " - ^ - " ^ 
m any manner whatsoever. 
^ ^ ^ • i a y o f A p r i U O O V . 
members 
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Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Cripperi & Cline L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 5394900 
Telefax! (801) 322-1054 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FILM iiSTBJCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 13 2008 
J)p$AlTUK£COUtfTY 
V Deputy Clerk 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS
 n 
DATE 
ESI AND FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME 
FOUNDATION, INC. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME 
ASSOCIATION, ERIC HOLMAN, 
CATHY COLLARD, PAM HOLMAN, 
JILL AUSTIN, USA KINGSBURY, 
KARA OLANDER, and 
MELLANIE TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
(DONALD GILBERT) 
CIVIL NO. 070902087 
JUDGE: Faust 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Disgorgement of Funds having come before the Court and 
there being no timely opposition thereto and good cause appearing it is hereby ordered, decreed and 
adjudged as follows. 
1. Plaintiffs Second Motion for Disgorgement of Funds is granted. 
Order and Judament (Donald Gilbert) @J 
JD2GG91071 pages: 
070902087 GILBERT,DONALD 
n A /* /* ; 
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i 
2. Utah Down Syndrome Foundation is granted judgmentagainstDonaldGilbertinthe 
amount of $30,000.00, to accrue interest at the prejudgment rate of 10% per annum on the following 
amounts from the following dates: on $6,000.00 from May 10,2007, on $9,000.00 from June 15, 
2007, on $7,500.00 from July 25,2007, and on $7,500.00 from January 31,2008, and at the post-
judgment rate of interest after entry hereof. 
3. UtahDownSyndromeFoundationisawardedinattomeysfeesagairistDonaldGilbert 
in the amount of $2,453.00. 
4. It is further ordered that this Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorneys fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise 
as shall be established by affidavit. 
Dated this fit^day of June, 2008. 
X 
/THE COURT ^ ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Ihereby certifythatlmailedatrue and correct copy oftheforegomg,postagepre«paidonthis 
3 day of June, 2008 to: 
Donald D.Gilbert 
POBoic335 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Kara Olander 
7469 S. Locust St 
Midvale,UT 84047 
Uptown Downs 
c/o Wendy Hooton 
3495 W. 8070 S. 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Up With Downs 
c/o Cherish Clements 
76 S. State St 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Eric Holman and Pam Holman 
76 S. Center St 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Cathy Collard 
1032 N. Redwood Rd. 
Saratoga Springs, UT 84043 
Lisa Kingsbury 
. 11996 Hidden Valley Club Dr. 
Sandy^UT 84092 
Mellariie Taylor 
3376 \j/. 8350 S. 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
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David C, Lewis 
c/o Novell Law Department 
1800 Sbuth Novell Place, Ste. H-54 
Provo, iUT 84606 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
\\Ji7f\Q W n^riy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: 
DONALD D. GILBERT JR., SBN 6733 
Respondent 
DONALD D. GILBERT JR. 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DOWN'S SYNDROME 
FOUNDATION, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6) OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 100401646 
Judge Fred D.Howard 
This matter comes before the Court on Third-Party Defendant Utah Down's Syndrome 
Foundation's ("UDSF") Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or, in the Alternative, 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on August 11, 2010. On August 25, 2010, Third-Party 
Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion. Third-Party Defendant filed a Reply and submitted 
the matter for decision on September 7, 2010. 
Having reviewed the parties' briefs, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing, the Gourt now makes the following ruling: 
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RULING 
The issues presented to the Court are whether Third-Party Plaintiff is properly joined to 
this action and whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent the Third-
Party Plaintiff from bringing his claim against Third-Party Defendant. 
The Court notes that it is treating Third-Party Defendant's Motion as a motion for 
summary judgment pursuant to DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996). 
Under that precedent "[w]hen affidavits or other evidence is presented in conjunction with a 
motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) and the court does not exclude them, the motion is 
generally treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56." Id. at 839 n.3. Third-Party Defendant has attached an affidavit and other material to its 
Motion which have not been excluded by the Court. Therefore, the Motion will be treated as a 
motion for summary judgment. 
Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on a motion for summary judgment 
"[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." URCP 
56(c) (2010). 
The parties do not dispute the facts with regard to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Third-Party Plaintiff filed a Third-Party Complaint against UDSF joining them to the law suit as 
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a Third-Party Defendant. The Motion having no factual dispute, the issue is whether "the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Third-Party Defendant is seeking dismissal 
from the lawsuit arguing that Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not allow the 
Third-Party Complaint to be brought against Third-Party Defendant in this case. It claims that 
because it is a disciplinary action and there is no monetary claim, Third-Party Defendant cannot 
be liable to Third-Party Plaintiff as required by Rule 14. Therefore, impleading Third-Party 
Defendant under Rule 14 is improper and Third-Party Defendant should be dismissed. (Mot. to 
Dismiss 6-7.) Defendant argues that Rule 14 does not preclude his claim because Rule 14 does 
not require that the underlying complaint be a claim seeking money damages. (Opp'n 4.) 
Regarding third-party practice, the Court is persuaded by authority accompanying Rule 14 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule permits that a defendant may proceed against 
any person "who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it." Utah's Rule 14(a) 
is nearly identical to the wording in Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court 
observes that the notes accompanying that rule reference Moore's Federal Practice - Civil, and 
that treatise explains that 
the nature of the relief sought by plaintiff in the underlying action may not rob defendant 
of its ability to implead. For example, consider a declaratory judgment case, in which [a]n 
insurer sues the insured, seeking a declaration that it is not obligated to cover a particular 
claim. The insured then impleads someone who, according to the insured, failed to obtain 
the proper insurance and from whom the insured will seek indemnity if the court declares 
that the insurer is not liable. Although one can argue that the plaintiffs judgment does not 
"cost" the defendant anything that can be passed on to the third-party defendant, the 
courts have properly allowed impleader. 
3 
n r i n 3 : P 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 14.04[2] (2010) (citation omitted). The treatise further 
states that 
[t]here is no doubt that use of the expansive concept of "claim," coupled with the strong 
policy desire for efficiency and consistency through inclusive joinder, frees impleader 
from historical limitations inherent in classic indemnity theories. Courts quite properly, 
then, conclude that the impleader rule is to be construed liberally to achieve its goal of 
efficient and consistent resolution of multiparty disputes. 
Id. 
The Court is persuaded that "Rule 14 contains no provision that the claim made in the 
underlying complaint must be a 'monetary' claim as UDSF claims." (Opp'n 4.) However, Third-
Party Plaintiff still must assert Third-Party Defendant's derivative liability. See Moore's Federal 
Practice, supra, at §14.04[3][a]. 
At least three of the counts against Mr. Gilbert in the disciplinary proceeding are based on 
allegations that he had no right to receive or retain the funds paid to him by the Utah and Salt 
Lake County Chapters of UDSF ("DBAs") for his services. (Compl. 8-11.) Furthermore, it is 
alleged that the DBAs are not separate entities from UDSF (Compl. 2, 5), and that Mr. Gilbert 
has the right to receive compensation for his work for the entities (Opp'n 5). Assuming that the 
allegation that the DBAs are not separate legal entities from UDSF is true, then it follows that 
UDSF could be liable to Mr. Gilbert for unpaid fees. Under such circumstances, Mr. Gilbert's 
claim against UDSF is derivative of the disciplinary action against him, and the Court cannot say 
at this time that the impleader is improper based on Rule 14. 
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The Court also notes that where, as in this case, there are common issues of law and fact, 
namely, the status of the DBAs and Mr. Gilbert's right to receive payment, it serves important 
policies of efficiency and consistency by permitting UDSF to be joined to this action. 
Finally, Third-Party Defendant contends that the impleader is barred by the doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel. Macris provides that a claim is precluded under res judicata 
when the following elements are met: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is 
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could 
and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, P 20 (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). For an issue to be precluded according to the principles of collateral 
estoppel the following must apply: 
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the case at hand. 
Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the 
previous action. Third, the issue must have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in 
the previous action. Fourth, the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the 
current action must have been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. 
Id. at P 37 (quoting Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 
(Utah 1996)). UDSF makes no analysis and does not show how the record satisfies the elements. 
Although UDSF's contention might be valid, the record is insufficient for the Court to determine 
that the action is barred. The Motion for Summary Judgment is, therefore, respectfully denied 
and Counsel for Third-Party Plaintiff is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
f DATED this / / day of November, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
IT day of November, 2010 to the following at the addresses indicated: 
Diane Akiyama 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Russell A. Cline 
Crippen & Cline, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lynn O. Poulson 
Johnson, Poulson & Coons 
1435 East 2000 North 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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